By Annie Weiler and Peter Kelley
In a rare moment of judicial unanimity, the Arizona Supreme Court recently affirmed that the government cannot hide information from its constituents. According to the Court, the state acts counter to basic principles of government transparency and right of access—when it destroys probative files instead of providing them to requestors.
Now that eight years have passed since Abraham’s initial request, Abraham v. Arizona Board of Regents came to a satisfying conclusion for First Amendment advocates. The Court has sided with the citizenry, and Arizonans now enjoy a more robust, comprehensive right of access. Now, it’s up to the Arizona Legislature to create a more comprehensive avenue for public record litigants to recover attorney fees.
Where Public Records Law Currently Stands
Like all states, Arizona maintains a range of “sunshine laws,” which are statutes and regulations that require government entities to—among other things—make their internal records accessible to curious constituents. Arizona codified its public record sunshine laws in A.R.S. §§ 39-121 through 39-161, allowing and encouraging the public to scrutinize and duplicate records maintained by government bodies. Should one be denied that right, A.R.S. § 39-121.02(C) allows them to sue the pertinent public body. The public body cannot evade its obligations by simply destroying the record; A.R.S. § 41-151.15(C) notes that an agency cannot toss any documents unless the state library decides it “has no further administrative, legal, fiscal, research or historical value.”
Still, litigating transparency isn’t cheap. Luckily, the statute also considered that, as § 39-121.02(b) allows a court to award attorney fees and other miscellaneous costs “reasonably incurred in [a public records action] if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed.”
But the statute doesn’t define “substantially prevailed.” The Arizona Supreme Court provided a high-level definition in 2021 in American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona v. Arizona Department of Child Safety, defining a party who has “substantially prevailed” as one who, based on the totality of the circumstances, was “more successful than not” in obtaining the requested records. In other words, the court needs to determine whether the requester got most of what the agency first refused to provide. Until Abraham, it was unclear whether records that an agency forfeits before a lawsuit—yet after retaining counsel—count as a win for the requester.
How We Got Here
When the University of Arizona administrators passed over his application for Associate Vice Provost, Dr. Matthew Abraham—a longtime English professor—wanted to understand why. Between 2018 and 2020, he filed a slew of public records requests against the University, seeking faculty committee meeting minutes, academic hiring information, recordings, and internal survey data. The University complied with some requests and withheld the remainder, citing interests in privacy, confidentiality, and every public body’s safety blanket, being “detrimental to the best interests of the state.” These are the three standard exemptions in the Arizona law as recognized by the state Supreme Court.
Among others, the University withheld a recording of a committee meeting. It said that Abraham may listen to the recording, but it wouldn’t let him obtain a copy. Abraham promptly declined and, again, requested the copy.
Abraham soon retained counsel, and the University readily disclosed a few more documents. Still, it kept some others under lock and key, eventually forking over 1,700 record pages and thick redaction log. It also bemoaned that the committee recording was “no longer available”—in other words, it had been destroyed. Eventually, Abraham filed a special action complaint against the Arizona Board of Regents, the body that governs Arizona’s public universities.
The trial court concluded that while the University had “substantially abused its discretion and/or acted arbitrarily” before receiving Abraham’s demand letter, it had effectively “cured” its abuse by later providing some of the documents. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Abraham was not entitled to the records. The University’s rationale seemed sufficient, and even if the agency got it wrong, the trial court shouldn’t step in unless the mistake constituted judicial abuse.
The Decision
The Arizona Supreme Court decided to review the case, releasing its decision in mid-September 2026. It principally found that “[d]estroying a public record after a member of the public requests it should land government agencies in legal trouble.” Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Clint Bolick noted that “post-request destruction of a document is the ultimate denial,” and “that destruction of the recording seems an obvious violation of the statutes.” Because the recording had been “the subject of a public records request, it surely had further legal value,” so “[a]n agency’s retention policy must yield to the statute.”
The Court also tied up a few other loose ends, including a public records standard of review and attorney fee determinations. For the former, it easily decided that trial courts must review public records redactions and nondisclosure via a de novo standard of review, meaning they must not simply defer to the agency’s determinations and instead come to their own conclusions.
But the Court found the latter to be “[t]he most difficult and contentious issue.” The University had produced at least some records before Abraham decided to retain counsel. It seemed unclear whether that pre-suit production should count toward whether Abraham “substantially prevailed.” To resolve the issue, the Court split the issue into two: first, whether the requester substantially prevailed, and second, whether that production could contribute toward the requester’s fee award.
For the former, the Court found that any contested or delayed documents produced before Abraham filed the suit would “count toward whether [he] has substantially prevailed.” Refusing to consider pre-suit successes would allow an agency to “stonewall a request until just before a lawsuit is filed without financial penalty.” In doing so, the Court patched this loophole.
For the latter, the Court interpreted the fees statute narrowly. Section 39-121.02(B) permits fees “reasonably incurred in any action.” Under nearby statutes, “action” refers to “any matter or proceeding in a court.” Accordingly, “attorney fees cannot be recovered unless litigation is commenced.” The hours that Abraham’s attorney spent writing the demand letter—and every dollar Abraham had to pay for it—fell outside of the attorney fees award. A public records victory feels less impactful when the plaintiff is stuck holding the pre-litigation bill.
In short, pre-litigation efforts can help a requester prove that they “substantially prevailed,” which is necessary to qualify for attorney fees. However, courts cannot reimburse the fruit of that labor, as the statute only allows them to award fees incurred in front of a court. This dichotomy creates an odd asymmetry. The same demand letter that contributes to a requester’s success cannot contribute to the fee award. And a requester whose letter works too well, prompting full production, would never file suit and thus never recover any fees.
Even if the Court wanted a different outcome—and it seemed the Court wanted one, as it lamented that public entities often lacked an incentive to comply with requests until someone threatens litigation—it found that those concerns were better left for the legislature.
The Remaining Gap
The Arizona Supreme Court took the first step to stop agencies from destroying records, but the legislature must codify it. Only litigants can enjoy de novo review; a standard of review is a purely judicial function. Similarly, some litigants may enjoy the apparent privilege of obtaining withheld records, as only the ones who can afford a demand letter and resulting litigation may have that access. Abandoning the remedy behind a paywall defies the statute’s purpose—exposing public records to public scrutiny. A constituent without the resources to file a special action and resurrect destroyed documents has just lost their ticket to government transparency and thwarting delinquent agencies.
The Arizona Legislature now holds this ticket in its hand. The answer lies in A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B)–(C), under which public records litigants may not recover pre-litigation fees—attorney fees may only be recovered after litigation has commenced. Expanding recovery under this section would not just allow more litigants to preserve their financial stability but signal that the days of agency deference—or, in invoking the “best interest of the state”—have started sunsetting.
The Arizona State Legislature has authorized the recovery of pre-litigation fees in multiple areas. A.R.S. § 12-348(B), which considers fees in lawsuits against the state and municipal governments, allows fees for pre-litigation administrative proceedings; A.R.S. § 41-1007 allows fees in agency proceedings on an itemized application with no court action; A.R.S. § 12-2030 discusses mandamus fees and allows the court to grant costs needed for pre-litigation expenses. Expanding fee recovery for public records, therefore, is a natural expansion of existing Arizona law; it would hardly be aberrant or unusual.
Accordingly, the Legislature should amend A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B) to include a provision that reads, with the relevant additions italicized below:
“The court may award attorney fees and other legal costs that are reasonably incurred in any action under this article if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed. An award under this subsection may include attorney fees and other legal costs incurred after access was denied or deemed denied and before the action was filed, in attempting to obtain the denied records. This subsection does not limit the rights of any party to recover attorney fees, expenses and double damages pursuant to section 12-349.”
Adding this short provision would be yet another major public records victory for Arizonans. Under current law, an agency can deny or ignore a request, wait to see whether the requester obtains counsel, and produce the records only once a demand letter arrives—in other words, it may encourage an agency to withhold the record until the requestor finds a lawyer. The amendment removes that perverse incentive by making agencies bear the cost of waiting, which encourages them to turn over records promptly.
Conclusion
In what is best considered a major win for government access advocates, the Arizona Supreme Court in Abraham v. Arizona Board of Regents took a major step toward strengthening Arizona’s presumption of disclosure. However, without a legislative amendment, only those with the funds to pursue litigation may recover attorney fees. A simple one-sentence addition to A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B) could close the gap, allowing fee recovery before litigation commences and encouraging agencies to hand over documents instead of seeing whether a person files a claim. Until the start of the fifty-eighth regular session in January 2027, access advocates will have to wait and see whether the Arizona State Legislature will complete what Abraham started.

