Clinic Students Discuss the Evolving Role of AI at Conference

By Brooke Paz & Tristan Brown

What role should artificial intelligence play in clinical legal education? This question sparked a thoughtful discussion at this year’s Rocky Mountain West Clinical Conference in Denver, where representatives of ASU Law’s First Amendment Clinic presented on the opportunities and challenges of integrating AI into clinical practice.

Returning after a decade-long hiatus, the conference brought together clinical educators from across the region at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law to explore this year’s theme, “Creativity in Clinical Education.”

First Amendment Clinic Director Gregg Leslie, Fellow and Assistant Teaching Professor Martha Lemar, and third-year law students Tristan Brown and Brooke Paz led a breakout session entitled “Ready or Not, It’s Here: Clinical Education in the Time of AI Explosion.”

Putting AI to the Test

In preparation for the conference, Tristan and Brooke—under the guidance of Professor Lemar—tested AI’s capabilities by completing legal assignments independently, directing AI to complete the same assignments, and then using AI to review their original work. Then, they evaluated the tools’ strengths and shortcomings and reflected on their potential applications in future legal practice.

AI in Motion Drafting and Short-Form Informative Writing

Tristan drafted a Rule 12(c) motion for a judgment on the pleadings in a school speech case with two other student attorneys at the clinic. After the three researched this area and drafted the motion, he prompted ChatGPT (in a sandboxed environment) to draft a Rule 12(c) motion after providing it with PDFs of the three cases cited in the motion, the pleadings, the applicable local rule, and a description of the strategy behind the motion.

The most notable difference between the human-drafted motion and ChatGPT’s was length, as the latter was twice as long. ChatGPT did not fully grasp the nuances of the strategy underlying the motion or some of the requirements of the local rule. However, it was effective at pulling rule statements and other helpful language from the three cases to build arguments.

ChatGPT was most effective at identifying helpful admissions in the Answer, which aligns with how practitioners use AI (in sandboxed environments) to analyze documents such as medical records or claim files. Some of ChatGPT’s suggestions regarding admissions in the Answer that should be more prominently featured ultimately made their way into the actual motion. Overall, ChatGPT can save considerable time by extracting information from dense documents or assisting with revisions. However, using AI for tasks that require more strategic thinking, such as drafting a motion with a specific strategic objective or greater nuance, may result in important considerations being lost in translation.

To test this theory, Tristan repeated the experiment with ChatGPT but gave it a smaller, less intensive task: drafting an informative blog post on the First Amendment right to film police.  Here, when instructed to draft something short and informative, ChatGPT did a much better job of getting to the point and understanding the assignment than it did with the Rule 12(c) motion.

Tristan’s main takeaway from this experiment was that when AI is given a longer leash and less guidance, it can stray further from the original goal. When the parameters are narrower and the assignment is less variable, AI can save time on the more cumbersome aspects of legal practice, allowing attorneys to focus on areas where AI cannot replace them.

AI in Legal Research and Memorandum Writing

Brooke drafted a legal memorandum examining how public records laws apply to journalism programs at public universities. After completing her own research and analysis, she tasked both ChatGPT and Westlaw’s CoCounsel with drafting the same memorandum.

The difference in time commitment was striking. Researching, drafting, and editing the original memorandum took approximately 20 hours. The AI-generated memoranda took seconds to minutes to produce, followed by a few hours of review to assess their accuracy.

The differences went beyond speed.

ChatGPT produced a well-organized, largely accurate memorandum and proactively asked follow-up questions to refine its analysis. Although some wording and pinpoint citations required correction, the overall quality was impressive. Most notably, ChatGPT identified two useful sources Brooke had not uncovered during her own research, demonstrating AI’s potential to supplement independent legal research.

CoCounsel, on the other hand, included useful procedural recommendations and practical checklists for university journalism centers. However, its writing was convoluted and repetitive, it more than doubled the assigned page limit, and it omitted citations despite explicit instructions.

This experiment demonstrated AI’s potential to improve efficiency and research while reinforcing the need for human oversight to ensure accurate, reliable legal work.

Brooke also highlighted AI’s potential applications in client intake, mediation, communications, and technical troubleshooting. By streamlining administrative tasks and making better use of limited resources, AI could help law school clinics expand access to legal services in their communities.

Looking Ahead: AI and Professional Responsibility

Professor Leslie offered a broader perspective on AI’s implications for the legal profession. Drawing on insight from ASU Law Professor Sean Harrington, Director of the AI and Legal Technology Lab, Professor Leslie discussed how attorneys’ professional responsibilities may evolve as AI becomes increasingly integrated into legal practice.

While much of today’s conversation focuses on the risks of using AI, Professor Leslie suggested that failing to use it could eventually raise professional responsibility concerns. As AI tools become more sophisticated, lawyers who disregard technologies capable of improving the accuracy or thoroughness of their work may risk falling short of evolving standards of professional diligence. Such developments could even have implications for legal malpractice liability and insurance coverage.

Although these possibilities remain speculative, they raise an important question for clinical legal education: If tomorrow’s attorneys may be expected to use AI competently, what responsibility do law schools have to prepare students for that reality?

A Candid Conversation About AI in the Classroom

The session concluded with a spirited Q&A, as attendees raised concerns about AI’s practical and ethical implications, including whether reviewing students’ prompts and AI-generated work would increase faculty workloads.

While the panel acknowledged that supervising AI-assisted work presents additional challenges, the technology is already widely accessible to students. This leaves law schools with a choice to either teach students how to use AI responsibly or leave them to navigate its ethical boundaries alone.

Other attendees questioned how students might use AI without their professor’s knowledge. Tristan and Brooke described tools such as Google’s NotebookLM, which can help transform lecture and reading notes into podcasts, video explainers, flashcards, and practice questions. Far from replacing the learning process, these applications provide additional resources for students to review their materials, test comprehension, and untangle difficult concepts.

Brooke also emphasized that most students have strong incentives to use AI ethically, including comprehending the material to pass their exams and the bar, developing professional competence, and satisfying character and fitness requirements for admission to the profession. Using AI to evade learning, she suggested, would only undermine those goals.

Although not every concern could be resolved in this session, the discussion continued afterward, with several attendees approaching Tristan to learn more about the students’ experiences and insights.

As AI reshapes legal practice, clinics have an opportunity to prepare students to harness its benefits, navigate its risks, and exercise the independent judgment required to provide competent legal representation.

And yes, AI helped write this blog post.

Disclosure: Generative AI tools were used to improve grammar, spelling, and clarity. This blog post was drafted by humans, and all suggestions were reviewed, edited, and approved by the authors.

Rabouin v. Zimmerman: A Fourth Amendment Case in First Amendment Clothing

By Mikel McGinley and Annie Weiler

Several years ago, a Phoenix Police Department (“PPD”) officer, Caleb Zimmerman, detained and searched a Wall Street Journal reporter, Dion Rabouin, for over ten minutes. At first glance, the occurrence reads like a hornbook First Amendment violation: an overzealous officer handcuffs a journalist after he interviewed passersby on the sidewalk. However, this case had a twist. The sidewalk Rabouin interviewed from wasn’t public, and the First Amendment doesn’t protect a right to gather news on another’s property without permission.

Yet, the City of Phoenix is on the hook for up to $100,000 for another alleged civil- or constitutional-rights violation. However, that payout likely derives from a PPD Fourth Amendment violation and an inadequately investigated discrimination claim, not a First Amendment breach. Still, without a bystander exercising her own First Amendment right to film law enforcement, the PPD might never have been held accountable.

The Incident

In November 2022, Rabouin was in Phoenix, Arizona, visiting family for Thanksgiving. While in town, he worked on a Wall Street Journal newsgathering assignment covering savings accounts and interest rates. As part of that assignment, Rabouin stood on a sidewalk outside a Chase Bank location in north Phoenix and conducted man-on-the-street interviews with bank clientele. After customers complained that he was approaching and asking personal questions, two Chase Bank employees asked Rabouin what he was doing. Then, once inside, one employee called the police, telling the dispatcher that Rabouin “doesn’t look like he’s a reporter.” While the parties dispute whether employees asked Rabouin to leave, PPD officers arrived soon after.

“The Right to Gather News”

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the press.” In Branzburg v. Hayes, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”

Further, the Arizona Constitution’s Speak Freely Clause states that “[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” The Arizona Supreme Court has regularly affirmed that Arizona’s analog “provides broader protections for free speech than the First Amendment.”

These provisions are well established and well litigated; indeed, they form the bedrock of much federal and Arizona law. So, when Zimmerman arrived on the scene, it would have been reasonable to assume he knew of Rabouin’s constitutionally protected right to gather news. However, while Rabouin believed the sidewalk he was interviewing on was public, it was actually private property.

Free Speech and Private Property

While courts consider public sidewalks quintessential “public forums”—in other words, space traditionally dedicated to public assembly and expression—courts do not extend that same courtesy to private sidewalks. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects against state action that infringes on speech rights but does not require private property owners to allow that speech. A private business does not transform into a public space just because it’s open to the public. Further, journalists don’t have the privilege to ignore the law just because they gather news. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court explained that generally applicable laws, like trespass, don’t violate the First Amendment just because they happen to burden the press.

So, can the same be said about Arizona’s more protective Speak Freely Clause? In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court held that states may grant more speech rights on private property than the First Amendment does. However, Arizona has declined to do so. In Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Committee, volunteers attempted to gather signatures at several Phoenix-area malls. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the state constitution doesn’t require private property owners to allow that kind of activity. Thus, on any given day, Rabouin has the right to gather news, but Chase Bank has no obligation to let him do so on its sidewalk.

The Detention and Search

Chase Bank employees did not want Rabouin on its property, and PPD agreed that Rabouin had trespassed. So why would the Phoenix City Council unanimously approve a payment of up to $100,000 if Rabouin met the elements of third-degree trespassing under A.R.S. § 13-1502?

Rabouin, who identified himself as a reporter, repeatedly agreed to leave the area after officers told him he was on the private sidewalk. Despite this, Zimmerman detained and handcuffed Rabouin, then searched his wallet in violation of PPD policy. Police can generally conduct a full search after a lawful custodial arrest, but not after a citation. However, timing exceptions exist, such as when the arrest is based on valid probable cause, and the search happens immediately before the arrest. Here, Rabouin received notice of trespass but was never charged, and officers never made a custodial arrest. Therefore, the search may have violated the Supreme Court’s explicit prohibition.

Bystander Video and Investigations

How do we know about this interaction? A prescient Chase Bank client, Katelyn Parady, filmed it. In Askins v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment protects the right to film matters of public interest, including law enforcement. Despite this precedent, Zimmerman threatened to arrest Parady. When backup arrived, another officer told her to stay eight feet back—a distance that appeared in a since-defunct state law that was eventually found unconstitutional. Parady later admitted she wasn’t sure of her rights at the time but felt it was important to record anyway. Even unknowingly, Parady asserted her First Amendment right, because she believed the detention of Rabouin, a black man, “was wrong and it was racist.”

The case received vigorous news coverage shortly after, largely thanks to Parady’s video. The Wall Street Journal’s Editor-in-Chief Matt Murray sent a letter to then-PPD Chief Michael Sullivan demanding an internal review and action to protect journalists. On December 9, 2022, barely two weeks after the incident, the PPD’s Professional Standards Bureau told Rabouin the case was closed without finding wrongdoing due to the detention. However, once the story hit national news, the PPD insisted the investigation had never been closed at all.

A second formal investigation later concluded that some of Zimmerman’s actions were at least suspect. An independent oversight review followed. It was determined that Bureau investigators never asked the officer whether race played a role in the detention and search. The Bureau didn’t properly examine whether Zimmerman could have de-escalated a situation in which the reporter had already offered to leave, nor do the records indicate why he failed to interview key bank employees at the time of the incident. Although the City of Phoenix was never required to admit wrongdoing, the U.S. Department of Justice, in a later withdrawn finding, found that the PPD failed to properly open a misconduct investigation into the incident until it made national news.

Public Reactions and Settlement

For its part, Chase Bank apologized directly to Rabouin, saying employees should never have called the police in the first place. Mayor Kate Gallego also apologized and promised reforms in the PPD. Conversely, the police union said Zimmerman acted professionally and characterized some news reporting on the issue as just “another hit piece.”

In November 2024, Rabouin sued Zimmerman in federal district court, alleging various Fourth Amendment violations stemming from the seizure of his person and search of his wallet. Section 1983 is a civil cause of action allowing individuals to sue state and local officials, including police officers, who violate federally protected rights while acting under color of law. Still, Rabouin also hoped Phoenix would train its officers on the First Amendment rights of reporters. By July 2026, the parties had agreed to a settlement.

Ultimately, despite press coverage that centered on a First Amendment rights violation, it was likely a Fourth Amendment search violation and an inadequately investigated discrimination claim that will see the former Wall Street Journal reporter with a sizeable payout. However, without a Good Samaritan bystander in Parady asserting her own First Amendment rights, the PPD may never have been held accountable for its transgression against this reporter.

Is It Legal to Film Police in Arizona? 

By Tristan Brown

Ordinary citizens have played a crucial role in documenting police misconduct. The era-defining footage of George Floyd’s murder or Rodney King’s beating happened because Darnella Frazier and George Holliday pressed record.

With smartphones, filming these events has never been easier. However, dozens of Arizonans who have filmed law enforcement, including ICE agents, have been subject to arrest as well as civil or criminal penalties.

So what conduct is protected and can you film law enforcement without fear of arrest? Here’s the current state of Arizona law and how to better your chances of avoiding arrest. 

The First Amendment Protects Your Right to Film Law Enforcement

The Ninth Circuit has recognized the First Amendment right to film matters of public interest as far back as 1995 in Fordyce v. City of Seattle. Recently, the Ninth Circuit has expanded the right to film from matters of public interest to police generally.

The right to film matters of public interest “includes the right to record law enforcement officers engaged in the exercise of their official duties in public places.” Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018).

In fact, the right to record “an officer performing official duties in public” is uncontested under federal law. Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2025). This right does not exist for no reason.

Indeed, the right to film police is protected newsgathering activity that “serves the Public’s First Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas.’” Arizona Broadcasters Ass’n v. Brnovich, 626 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1105 (D. Ariz. 2022).

Thus, the Ninth Circuit and District Court of Arizona have repeatedly made clear that your ability to film police officers performing their official duties in public is protected under the First Amendment. Police cannot make a retaliatory arrest against you merely for filming their conduct.

Arizona’s “Eight-Foot Law” was Held Unconstitutional

A controversial piece of Arizona legislation in this area was the short-lived A.R.S. § 13-3732, which made it a class 3 misdemeanor to “make a video recording of law enforcement…within eight feet” of law enforcement activity despite being told to stop by the officer.

The law defined police activity broadly to include “[q]uestioning a suspicious person,” “[c]onducting an arrest, issuing a summons or enforcing the law,” or “[h]andling an emotionally disturbed or disorderly person who is exhibiting abnormal behavior.”

Before the law was even enacted, the U.S. District Court of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction in Arizona Broadcasters Ass’n v. Brnovich, holding that the law was a content-based restriction on speech. Arizona Broadcasters Ass’n, 626 F. Supp. 3d at 1106.

The court concluded that that the law failed under a strict scrutiny analysis and was therefore unconstitutional, reasoning that other Arizona laws adequately prevented interference with police officers.

Further, the law was simultaneously over-inclusive since anyone filming near a police officer even without interfering would be caught in the law’s wide net, and under-inclusive since photographs or audio recordings taken from the same device or distance were not.

Despite still existing on the legislature’s website, A.R.S. § 13-3732 has been held unconstitutional and unenforceable.

Key Factors to Avoid Arrest While Filming Police

Although protected under the First Amendment, filming police can lead to arrest on other grounds if you don’t play your cards right.

  1. You must be lawfully present in public.

The cited Ninth Circuit cases emphasizing the First Amendment right to film police comes with the caveat that it must occur “in public places.” These include streets, sidewalks, and parks, places where the government’s regulation of free speech is limited. See Askins, 899 F.3d at 1044.

  1. You cannot use or threaten to use force to prevent an officer from arresting someone.

The Arizona Broadcasters Ass’n v. Brnovich case referenced Arizona laws already on the books that render the Eight Foot Law “unnecessary.” One such law is A.R.S. § 13-2402, which prohibits obstructing, impairing or hindering a public servant’s performance of government functions under color of their official authority. Interestingly, arrests are explicitly not included.

Under A.R.S. § 13-2508, anyone using or threatening to use physical force, or doing anything that creates a substantial risk of causing physical injury to law enforcement to prevent an officer from making an arrest can be charged with a felony. Even the use of passive resistance, or “a nonviolent physical act or failure to act that is intended to impede, hinder or delay to prevent an arrest” can result in a misdemeanor.

Overall, the act of filming law enforcement alone cannot get you arrested without violating your First Amendment rights. However, you must exercise your rights in public and avoid using or threatening to use force if law enforcement is making arrests.

If your First Amendment rights have been infringed upon by the government, fill out a consultation form with the First Amendment Clinic at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.

Speaking “Freely” After Center for Arizona Policy

By Annie Weiler and Christina Ge  

Arizona has a complicated history with dark money. Once crowned the “Chamber of Secrets State” and “ground zero” for anonymous political spending, Arizona has spent decades as the stomping ground for untraceable cash, thanks largely to its purple politics and relatively permissible campaign finance laws. After millions of dark dollars flooded Arizona’s 2020 elections, voters seemingly had enough. In 2022, nearly 72% of voters approved Proposition 211, which requires entities participating in election advertisements to disclose where—or who—their money came from. 

Backlash was swift. Some Arizonans sued, arguing that Proposition 211 violated, among other provisions, Arizona’s Speak Freely Clause. Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court preserved Proposition 211. In safeguarding one of the nation’s most rigorous disclosure laws, the Court also reshaped the state’s free-speech doctrine: Under the Arizona Constitution, speaking “freely” does not mean freedom from the state’s police power.  

The Mechanics of Dark Money 

Dark money refers to “untraceable money.” The concept implicates political spending meant to influence a voter where neither the donor nor the source is disclosed. Generally, dark money follows a three-step process: 

  1. A donor gives money to a nonprofit “social welfare” organization organized under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(4) (or a trade association under § 501(c)(6)); 
  1. The nonprofit either spends that money on election ads or passes it to a super PAC, which is a political committee that can raise and spend unlimited amounts to influence elections; and 
  1. The money is spent on ads in an upcoming election. 

Unlike candidates and political committees, these nonprofits generally do not have to publicly disclose their donors. Super PACs may report their donors, but when that donor is a nonprofit, the disclosure report only names the nonprofit. In other words, whoever originally provided the money to the nonprofit does not appear in the report. The person or company that originally supplied the money stays hidden.  

Arizona’s Struggles with Dark Money  

Arizona has a storied history with dark money. Former Arizona House Majority Whip Chris Herstam bluntly called dark money “the most corrupting influence [he’d] seen” in his three decades in Arizona politics. While reasonable minds can differ over how and why Arizona became such a hotbed for dark money, three factors stand out. 

First, Arizona is a mission-critical battleground state. Control over Congress and who secures the presidency often hinges on how Arizona swings in the elections. National donors and special interest groups pour enormous amounts of cash into the state, betting that Arizona will be decisive in shaping border, immigration, and civil rights policy. Nearly three-fourths of campaign funding in major Arizona congressional races comes from out-of-state donors. 

Second, Arizona’s regulatory framework for campaign money is strikingly laissez-faire. It does not limit corporations’ ability to donate to political parties and super-PACs, lacks a state-specific ban on foreign election spending in state or local elections, and allocates few resources to campaign finance laws. Candidates and political committees must report their donors, but nonprofit “social welfare” groups can pour unlimited sums into political ads without ever revealing the source of their money.  

Third, Arizona has emerged as the heart of major operative networks, technological titans, and sophisticated political consultants. Accordingly, Arizona draws stunning sums from national conglomerates—which dish hundreds of millions through an intricate web of nonprofits every year—with a stake in its policy decisions. 

Speak Freely Clause of the Arizona Constitution 

Article 2, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution provides that “[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” Arizona courts regularly address this provision, as it is Arizona’s counterpart to the First Amendment. In Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona Supreme Court assured us—and not for the first time—that the state constitution protects speech more broadly than the federal one. The Court described the Speak Freely Clause as “a guarantee of the individual right” to speak, write, and publish, a right that can be restricted only when someone abuses it. 

Proposition 211 

Proposition 211, the Voters’ Right to Know Act, appeared on Arizona’s 2022 ballot. Under this proposition, people and entities spending a certain amount in election advertising must publicly disclose every donor who contributed more than $5,000 toward that spending. They must trace the money back through any intermediaries to its original source. Donors receive notice and a chance to opt out of having their contributions used for campaign advertisements.  

Supporters argued that voters have a right to know who is paying to influence the election, and anyone looking to invest their money in an election must be willing to stand behind who or what cause they donated to. Critics warned that exposing donors would invite harassment and discourage people from supporting unpopular causes.  

On election day, Proposition 211 passed with flying colors, earning 72% of the vote. 

The Litigation, Decision, and Reasoning 

The Center for Arizona Policy, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, and two anonymous donors sued the Arizona Secretary of State, arguing that Proposition 211 violated the Speak Freely Clause by chilling political speech. 

In a 4-to-3 decision, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court. Along the way, it scrapped the tiers of scrutiny familiar in First Amendment jurisprudence—describing them as “overly rigid,” “results-oriented,” “one-size-fits-all,” and “ill-fitting”—before devising its own for Speak Freely Clause challenges. First, a court must determine whether the Clause protects the expression at issue, which must examine what the Clause meant to Arizonans in 1911. Here, after an originalist public-meaning detour, the Court found that donating to fund campaign media is expressive conduct. In 1911, “speaking” included expressing oneself, and donating fits within that parameter.  

Next, a court must examine whether the challenged law prevents people from “freely” speaking, writing, and publishing. The Court read “freely” as prohibiting prior restraints, punishment for non-abusive speech, and compelled speech. But according to the Court, “freely” never meant free from all regulations. Statehood-era Arizonans lived alongside libel laws, licensing ordinances and campaign-finance reporting. Thus, they understood that the police power “enabled the government to compel factual, nonideological disclosures necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare.” The government may also act on the Constitution’s own directives, including one clause that requires the legislature to secure “the purity of elections.”  

As a result, the operative test now seems to be whether regulation is reasonable, not whether the regulated speech is actually abusive. Depending on the context, the majority notes that it might protect more, the same, or less. Accordingly, speaking “freely” doesn’t mean speaking free of the government’s legitimate regulatory powers—it only means freedom from censorship, prior restraint, and compulsion.  

Given the multitudinous territorial disclosure laws, the Arizona Constitution’s General Publicity Clause, and a 1917 statute banning anonymous ballot-measure ads, the Court concluded that Arizonans have never considered campaign-finance disclosure inconsistent with free speech. On their as-applied Speak Freely claim, the plaintiffs pointed at death threats, a vandalized staff car, and an attempted firebombing tied to their advocacy. The Court held that claim was “minimally sufficient” at this stage, remanding it for the superior court to parse.  

How Litigants May Move Forward 

Proposition 211 lives to see another day, but litigation is not over. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, meaning the law is not unconstitutional in every application, and it affirmed the dismissal of their claim under the Private Affairs Clause. But the plaintiffs’ claim over how the law applies in their circumstance, called an “as-applied” challenge, returns to the superior court, where they must show that disclosure exposes their specific donors to threats and harassment. 

This decision’s most lasting contribution is likely that Arizonans accepted factual, nonideological disclosure as a legitimate use of the police power. While it solidifies the Clause in Arizona’s text and history rather than recycled federal tests, it may also fundamentally alter how courts treat it. In Brush & Nib, the Court focused on whether the speech was abusive, but here, it considered whether a regulation falls within the state’s regulatory authority. Even if the Clause still forbids censorship and prior restraint, the line between permissible regulation and impermissible restraint is not self-defining, and lower courts must draw it case by case. 

It’s unclear what that shift might mean in practice. Since Brush & Nib, Arizona litigants have treated the Clause as offering more protection than the First Amendment. That assumption looks less reliable after the majority’s note that the Clause may protect more, the same, or less depending on context. Litigants challenging speech regulations will likely want to bring federal and state claims together, forcing them to be evaluated under the federal First Amendment. as they can no longer rely on the Clause to protect speech more fervently or comprehensively than the First Amendment.  

Meanwhile, a closely related case brought under federal law made it to the Ninth Circuit and survived. In Americans for Prosperity v. Meyer, a divided panel held that Proposition 211 does not violate the First Amendment. The majority found that the law’s disclosure requirements are substantially related to the state’s interest in giving voters accurate information about who is funding election ads. Judge Bumatay, in staunch dissent, argued that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not allow such sweeping disclosure. While some commentators believe that a petition to the United States Supreme Court “seems likely,” for now, Proposition 211 remains in effect for Arizona’s record-breaking midterm elections. 

Looking Ahead 

Center for Arizona Policy reads like a remarkable win for free speech. Arizona voters demanded to know who funds election advertisements, and both the Arizona Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit now upheld their right to find out. But in ensuring that Proposition 211 lives to see another day, it has also suggested—for the first time ever—that the Speak Freely Clause may protect less than the federal First Amendment. With its historical analysis, the Court changed how Arizona courts will evaluate free-speech claims going forward. Now, the as-applied challenge proceeds, possible United States Supreme Court review looms, and courts must apply this novel framework to ensure Arizona protects both clean elections and robust free speech.  

Finishing What Abraham Started: Fixing Pre-Litigation Fees in Public Record Disputes 

By Annie Weiler and Peter Kelley 

In a rare moment of judicial unanimity, the Arizona Supreme Court recently affirmed that the government cannot hide information from its constituents. According to the Court, the state acts counter to basic principles of government transparency and right of access—when it destroys probative files instead of providing them to requestors. 

Now that eight years have passed since Abraham’s initial request, Abraham v. Arizona Board of Regents came to a satisfying conclusion for First Amendment advocates. The Court has sided with the citizenry, and Arizonans now enjoy a more robust, comprehensive right of access. Now, it’s up to the Arizona Legislature to create a more comprehensive avenue for public record litigants to recover attorney fees.  

Where Public Records Law Currently Stands 

Like all states, Arizona maintains a range of “sunshine laws,” which are statutes and regulations that require government entities to—among other things—make their internal records accessible to curious constituents. Arizona codified its public record sunshine laws in A.R.S. §§ 39-121 through 39-161, allowing and encouraging the public to scrutinize and duplicate records maintained by government bodies. Should one be denied that right, A.R.S. § 39-121.02(C) allows them to sue the pertinent public body. The public body cannot evade its obligations by simply destroying the record; A.R.S. § 41-151.15(C) notes that an agency cannot toss any documents unless the state library decides it “has no further administrative, legal, fiscal, research or historical value.”

Still, litigating transparency isn’t cheap. Luckily, the statute also considered that, as § 39-121.02(b) allows a court to award attorney fees and other miscellaneous costs “reasonably incurred in [a public records action] if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed.”

But the statute doesn’t define “substantially prevailed.” The Arizona Supreme Court provided a high-level definition in 2021 in American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona v. Arizona Department of Child Safety, defining a party who has “substantially prevailed” as one who, based on the totality of the circumstances, was “more successful than not” in obtaining the requested records. In other words, the court needs to determine whether the requester got most of what the agency first refused to provide. Until Abraham, it was unclear whether records that an agency forfeits before a lawsuit—yet after retaining counsel—count as a win for the requester. 

How We Got Here 

When the University of Arizona administrators passed over his application for Associate Vice Provost, Dr. Matthew Abraham—a longtime English professor—wanted to understand why. Between 2018 and 2020, he filed a slew of public records requests against the University, seeking faculty committee meeting minutes, academic hiring information, recordings, and internal survey data. The University complied with some requests and withheld the remainder, citing interests in privacy, confidentiality, and every public body’s safety blanket, being “detrimental to the best interests of the state.” These are the three standard exemptions in the Arizona law as recognized by the state Supreme Court.  

Among others, the University withheld a recording of a committee meeting. It said that Abraham may listen to the recording, but it wouldn’t let him obtain a copy. Abraham promptly declined and, again, requested the copy.  

Abraham soon retained counsel, and the University readily disclosed a few more documents. Still, it kept some others under lock and key, eventually forking over 1,700 record pages and thick redaction log.  It also bemoaned that the committee recording was “no longer available”—in other words, it had been destroyed. Eventually, Abraham filed a special action complaint against the Arizona Board of Regents, the body that governs Arizona’s public universities.  

The trial court concluded that while the University had “substantially abused its discretion and/or acted arbitrarily” before receiving Abraham’s demand letter, it had effectively “cured” its abuse by later providing some of the documents. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Abraham was not entitled to the records. The University’s rationale seemed sufficient, and even if the agency got it wrong, the trial court shouldn’t step in unless the mistake constituted judicial abuse. 

The Decision 

The Arizona Supreme Court decided to review the case, releasing its decision in mid-September 2026. It principally found that “[d]estroying a public record after a member of the public requests it should land government agencies in legal trouble.” Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Clint Bolick noted that “post-request destruction of a document is the ultimate denial,” and “that destruction of the recording seems an obvious violation of the statutes.” Because the recording had been “the subject of a public records request, it surely had further legal value,” so “[a]n agency’s retention policy must yield to the statute.”  

The Court also tied up a few other loose ends, including a public records standard of review and attorney fee determinations. For the former, it easily decided that trial courts must review public records redactions and nondisclosure via a de novo standard of review, meaning they must not simply defer to the agency’s determinations and instead come to their own conclusions.  

But the Court found the latter to be “[t]he most difficult and contentious issue.” The University had produced at least some records before Abraham decided to retain counsel. It seemed unclear whether that pre-suit production should count toward whether Abraham “substantially prevailed.” To resolve the issue, the Court split the issue into two: first, whether the requester substantially prevailed, and second, whether that production could contribute toward the requester’s fee award. 

For the former, the Court found that any contested or delayed documents produced before Abraham filed the suit would “count toward whether [he] has substantially prevailed.” Refusing to consider pre-suit successes would allow an agency to “stonewall a request until just before a lawsuit is filed without financial penalty.” In doing so, the Court patched this loophole.  

For the latter, the Court interpreted the fees statute narrowly. Section 39-121.02(B) permits fees “reasonably incurred in any action.” Under nearby statutes, “action” refers to “any matter or proceeding in a court.” Accordingly, “attorney fees cannot be recovered unless litigation is commenced.” The hours that Abraham’s attorney spent writing the demand letter—and every dollar Abraham had to pay for it—fell outside of the attorney fees award. A public records victory feels less impactful when the plaintiff is stuck holding the pre-litigation bill.   

In short, pre-litigation efforts can help a requester prove that they “substantially prevailed,” which is necessary to qualify for attorney fees. However, courts cannot reimburse the fruit of that labor, as the statute only allows them to award fees incurred in front of a court. This dichotomy creates an odd asymmetry. The same demand letter that contributes to a requester’s success cannot contribute to the fee award. And a requester whose letter works too well, prompting full production, would never file suit and thus never recover any fees. 

Even if the Court wanted a different outcome—and it seemed the Court wanted one, as it lamented that public entities often lacked an incentive to comply with requests until someone threatens litigation—it found that those concerns were better left for the legislature. 

The Remaining Gap 

The Arizona Supreme Court took the first step to stop agencies from destroying records, but the legislature must codify it. Only litigants can enjoy de novo review; a standard of review is a purely judicial function. Similarly, some litigants may enjoy the apparent privilege of obtaining withheld records, as only the ones who can afford a demand letter and resulting litigation may have that access. Abandoning the remedy behind a paywall defies the statute’s purpose—exposing public records to public scrutiny. A constituent without the resources to file a special action and resurrect destroyed documents has just lost their ticket to government transparency and thwarting delinquent agencies. 

The Arizona Legislature now holds this ticket in its hand. The answer lies in A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B)–(C), under which public records litigants may not recover pre-litigation fees—attorney fees may only be recovered after litigation has commenced. Expanding recovery under this section would not just allow more litigants to preserve their financial stability but signal that the days of agency deference—or, in invoking the “best interest of the state”—have started sunsetting.  

The Arizona State Legislature has authorized the recovery of pre-litigation fees in multiple areas. A.R.S. § 12-348(B), which considers fees in lawsuits against the state and municipal governments, allows fees for pre-litigation administrative proceedings; A.R.S. § 41-1007 allows fees in agency proceedings on an itemized application with no court action; A.R.S. § 12-2030 discusses mandamus fees and allows the court to grant costs needed for pre-litigation expenses. Expanding fee recovery for public records, therefore, is a natural expansion of existing Arizona law; it would hardly be aberrant or unusual. 

Accordingly, the Legislature should amend A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B) to include a provision that reads, with the relevant additions italicized below: 

“The court may award attorney fees and other legal costs that are reasonably incurred in any action under this article if the person seeking public records has substantially prevailed. An award under this subsection may include attorney fees and other legal costs incurred after access was denied or deemed denied and before the action was filed, in attempting to obtain the denied records. This subsection does not limit the rights of any party to recover attorney fees, expenses and double damages pursuant to section 12-349.” 

Adding this short provision would be yet another major public records victory for Arizonans. Under current law, an agency can deny or ignore a request, wait to see whether the requester obtains counsel, and produce the records only once a demand letter arrives—in other words, it may encourage an agency to withhold the record until the requestor finds a lawyer. The amendment removes that perverse incentive by making agencies bear the cost of waiting, which encourages them to turn over records promptly.  

Conclusion 

In what is best considered a major win for government access advocates, the Arizona Supreme Court in Abraham v. Arizona Board of Regents took a major step toward strengthening Arizona’s presumption of disclosure. However, without a legislative amendment, only those with the funds to pursue litigation may recover attorney fees. A simple one-sentence addition to A.R.S. § 39-121.02(B) could close the gap, allowing fee recovery before litigation commences and encouraging agencies to hand over documents instead of seeing whether a person files a claim. Until the start of the fifty-eighth regular session in January 2027, access advocates will have to wait and see whether the Arizona State Legislature will complete what Abraham started.  

City of Glendale rescinds panhandling statute in response to clinic lawsuit

The Glendale City Council voted on Sept. 9 to repeal three panhandling bans, in direct response to a lawsuit brought by ASU Law’s First Amendment Clinic.

The case, filed July 30 on behalf of three Glendale residents, argued that the city’s ordinances violated the First Amendment right to engage in protected speech. Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction to stop Glendale from enforcing laws that prohibited requests for money, donations or other items of value.

ASU Law students played a critical role in the case, contributing to every stage of the litigation. See ASU Law News for more details.

Journalist arrested while filming police sues Yuma and Officer

The First Amendment Clinic at Arizona State University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of law sued the city of Yuma and Officer James Baisch of the Yuma Police Department last month on behalf of independent journalist Lucas Mullikin, who was arrested in May 2023 while peacefully filming Yuma officers.

In May of 2023, Mullikin was driving through Yuma when he stopped to record a Yuma Police Department officer struggling to arrest a homeless man on a sidewalk. Mullikin was ordered to “get back” from the scene of the arrest and then was forced back and pushed to the ground. After Mullikin stood up and asked Officer Baisch for his badge number, Officer Baisch arrested Mullikin for failing to obey a lawful order and resisting arrest.

Mullikin’s lawsuit, filed February 25, 2025, accuses Yuma and Officer Baisch of retaliating against Mullikin for filming officers, using excessive force, and arresting him unlawfully. Mullikin is seeking unspecified damages and an injunction restraining the Yuma Police Department from maintaining its currently inadequate policies, training and supervision.

Complaint

First Amendment Clinic wins Supreme Court case, allowing journalists to qualify as researchers eligible to obtain ADES protection records.

The Arizona Supreme Court decided today that journalists can be engaged in the type of “bona fide research” that would allow them to see if a state health agency is protecting vulnerable adults under its care.

Students from the First Amendment Clinic represented journalist Amy Silverman, who has been researching whether the protective services division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security is adequately responding to abuse allegations. The records are confidential, but state law provides an exception for those engaged in “bona fide research” to obtain the records as long as all personally identifying information is redacted.

“This is an important win for our client and for all journalists,” said First Amendment Clinic Director Gregg Leslie. “Agencies are too quick to undervalue the work that investigative journalists do, and the Court has recognized that a statute that allows public access to information so agencies can be held accountable for their work also allows journalists to examine those agency actions.”

ADES said that journalists did not qualify for that exception, which should only apply to researchers who are assisting the agency. But the high court disagreed, pointing out that “interpreting the statute as categorically excluding journalists would raise serious freedom of speech and equal protection concerns.”

The case must now go back to the trial court to apply the new test and to consider other ADES objections to the scope of the request.